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Abstract
We investigate the previously unexplored herding behaviour of investors in
option markets, by examining equity option contracts traded in the US be-
tween 1996 and 2012. We document strong herding effects in option trading
activity that are conditional on a set of systematic factors related to peri-
ods of market stress. More specifically, we find that option investors tend
to herd during periods of high market volatility risk, on dates of macroe-
conomic announcements, during the financial crisis of 2008, when a large
number of market option positions is either opened or closed, and during
periods of a large average dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.
Keywords: Herding; Cross-Sectional Dispersion; Options
JEL Classifications: G14; G11
1 Introduction
Financial economic models based on a strong form of the Efficient Market Hy-
pothesis (EMH) rely on the assumption that individual market participants make
investment decisions by processing their own information sets. However, in line
with behavioural explanations, a number of recent studies have examined the ten-
dency of investors to suppress their own beliefs in favour of the market consensus
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bury CT2 7PE, UK. Tel: +44(0)1227827705. E-mail: n.voukelatos@kent.ac.uk. We would like
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when trading in individual assets (see Galariotis et al., 2014 and Holmes et al.,
2013). Such behaviour is typically referred to as “herding” and carries significant
implications in terms of reducing diversification benefits and, in general, causing
asset prices to deviate from their fundamental values.1
Currently, there is a considerable empirical literature on detecting a potential
herding behaviour, but it is mainly focused on stock markets (see, for instance,
Christie and Huang, 1995, Chang et al., 2000, Chiang and Zheng, 2010, and Galar-
iotis et al., 2014, among others). Nevertheless, the issue of a similar behaviour
among investors who trade options has remained under-researched. The objective
of this paper is to bridge this gap by studying the previously unexplored herding
mechanism in option trading activity. We use data from the US equity options
market between 1996 and 2012 to investigate potential herding attitudes reflected
in option transactions. More specifically, we examine whether, and under what
circumstances, the returns of individual option contracts tend to cluster around
the market consensus more closely than would have been expected.
The study of herding among option investors is of particular importance for
several reasons. First, option trading represents a considerable segment of global
financial markets and has experienced a constant and rapid growth. For instance,
between 1973 and 2012 in the US, the equity options volume and the number of
stocks with options written on them have grown on average by 33% and 24% per
annum, respectively.2 Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that option trading
improves the market’s informational efficiency as a whole by increasing the quality
of information flows (Chern et al., 2008; De Jong et al., 2006; Kumar et al.,
1998). In this context, a potential herding behaviour in options, where investors
may suppress their own beliefs in favour of mimicking the actions of the majority,
would decrease potential benefits in market quality stemming from option trading.
Furthermore, given the use of options for hedging purposes, herding is also likely to
affect the risk exposure of portfolios that use option contracts as a risk management
tool.
One stream of the related literature has investigated the presence of herding
by analysing the correlation dynamics among stocks in a particular market or,
from an international perspective, between different markets (Bekaert et al., 2012;
Boyer et al., 2006; Chiang et al., 2007). A second stream of the literature proposes
the cross-sectional dispersion of asset returns around the market consensus as an
economically meaningful measure of herding. However, these studies do not find,
in general, evidence to support the hypothesis of herding in the US equity market.
For instance, Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) examine whether
1See, Devenow and Welch (1996) and Spyrou (2013) for a literature review in relation to
herding behaviour.
2Option Clearing Corporation, http:// www.optionsclearing.com.
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cross-sectional dispersion tends to be significantly lower during extreme negative
and positive market returns, which would imply that investors herd, and find
no evidence to support this hypothesis. However, Chiang and Zheng (2010) and
Galariotis et al. (2014) represent the exception. Chiang and Zheng (2010) detect
the presence of moderate herding in the equity market during the 2008 financial
crisis, while Galariotis et al. (2014) find evidence of herding around fundamental
macroeconomic announcements and stress periods in the US and the UK.3
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature on herding in a number of
ways. First, we extend the investigation of herding behaviour into a new asset
class, namely equity options. To this end, we perform tests to detect herding
across groups of option contracts with different characteristics (i.e., leverage and
contract type). Second, we expand the set of factors that may drive herding effects;
in particular factors associated with periods of uncertainty. Previous studies have
examined the impact of factors related to firm size, exchange price limits and
crises on herding behaviour. We investigate the role of different systematic factors
associated with periods of market stress such as volatility risk, skewness risk, index
options’ open interest, macroeconomic announcements and the mean dispersion of
analysts’ forecasts.
We follow the methodology used by Christie and Huang (1995), Chang et al.
(2000), Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Galariotis et al. (2014), in which herd-
ing is proxied by the cross-sectional dispersion of asset returns (differentiated by
contract features) around the market consensus. The intuition behind this mea-
sure is that investors make their trading decisions for different assets by solving a
multi-dimensional problem which is particular to each agent. For example, trading
decisions are based on the way each investor analyses and interprets information
about different securities, the individual’s prior beliefs, the investor’s particular
reasons for trading (e.g., some investors trade to make profits through the trading
activity per se, while others trade for hedging purposes or tax reductions), among
other reasons that are intrinsic to each investor and to each asset. Therefore,
prices and returns should reflect heterogeneities in the decision processes followed
by different agents and for different financial instruments; hence a considerable
cross-sectional dispersion of individual asset returns is expected. Moreover, the
cross-sectional dispersion of individual asset returns should be even higher in “ex-
3Despite the lack of strong evidence of herding behaviour in the US equity market, herding
effects have been documented in other international equity markets, such as European and Latin
American markets, Australia, and most Asian markets (Chang et al., 2000; Economou et al.,
2011; Galariotis et al., 2014; Mobarek et al., 2014; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Chiang et al., 2013).
Stocks in most of these countries have been shown to herd around the return of the domestic
market, as well as to those of neighbouring equity markets. Other studies have also detected
herding behaviour in mutual funds (Grinblatt et al., 1995), corporate bonds (Cai et al., 2012)
and commodity futures (Demirer et al., 2013).
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treme market conditions” such as periods of high volatility, during crises, or around
days of new information releases (e.g., macro announcements). In contrast, the
herding hypothesis suggests that market participants are more likely to suppress
their own private views during “periods of market stress”, in favour of following
the market consensus, thus the cross-sectional dispersion is expected to decrease
in scenarios surrounded by a significant degree of uncertainty.
We find evidence in support of the herding hypothesis in the option market,
conditional on a set of systematic factors related to periods of market stress. Thus,
our study is particularly related to Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Galariotis et al.
(2014) who report herding attitudes around macro announcements and during
crises, albeit using data from equity markets. First, we show that herding in
options is associated with market volatility risk, suggesting that investors tend
to follow the market consensus during periods of high market uncertainty. We
report strong herding effects when macroeconomic information is released, as well
as during the financial crisis of 2008. We show that herding tendencies are more
pronounced when an extremely high number of market option positions is either
opened or closed, as reflected in changes in the open interest of index options.
Moreover, we find that the mean analysts’ forecast dispersion in the aggregate
equity market is also related to herding effects.4
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
methodology used to compute the cross-sectional dispersion of option returns and
to test for the presence of herding effects in option markets. Section 3 provides a
brief description of the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the
main empirical findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Measuring Herding in Options
We apply a modified version of the methodology used by Christie and Huang
(1995), Chang et al. (2000), Chiang and Zheng (2010) and Galariotis et al. (2014)
for herding in stock markets. In these studies, herding behaviour is explored by
examining the cross-sectional dispersion of individual stock returns around the
market consensus, where the market consensus is usually proxied by the returns of
4In addition, in unreported analyses, we also study whether idiosyncratic characteristics of
option contracts (e.g. option trading volume, implied volatility and open interest of each option
contract group) and features of underlying assets (e.g. stock trading volume, stock CAPM betas,
historical volatility, number of analysts and forecasts dispersions per each underlying stock) are
related to option herding behaviours. However, we do not find any evidence of herding effects
in relation to specific characteristics of individual options or features of underlying assets. We
discuss further about these analyses in Section 4.
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market indices (e.g., S&P 500 or Dow Jones).5 The rationale behind this measure
is related to the heterogeneity which characterizes trading decisions followed by
different investors and for different assets.
Our use of options in detecting herding attitudes has two significant method-
ological implications given that the cross-section of options on individual stocks
constitutes a group of assets that is far from homogeneous. For instance, con-
sider the realized return Rmkt,t of the equity market at time t. When examining
the underlying equity market, the extreme hypothetical case of “perfect” herding
would be represented by all stocks offering exactly the same return as the equity
market, i.e. Ri,t = Rmkt,t, ∀i ∈ N . This is an appealing and intuitive property for
the dispersion measure, but it is not applicable when the entire cross-section of
options is considered. More specifically, let Rcp,m,Mi,t denote the return at time t of
an option contract written on the underlying asset i, where cp is the option type
(either c for call or p for put), m refers to the option’s moneyness, and M is the
time-to-maturity. The first derivative of the expected option return with respect
to the underlying expected return is positive for calls (
∂E[Rc,m,Mi,t ]
∂E[Ri,t]
> 0) and negative
for puts (
∂E[Rp,m,Mi,t ]
∂E[Ri,t]
< 0). Therefore, including both calls and puts in the same
dispersion measure would be highly problematic since their prices would move in
different directions by default, artificially increasing cross-sectional dispersion.
In addition, the first derivative of expected option returns with respect to
the strike price K is positive for both calls and puts, i.e.
∂E[Rc,m,Mi,t ]
∂K
> 0 and
∂E[Rp,m,Mi,t ]
∂K
> 0 (propositions 1 and 2 in Coval and Shumway, 2001), with options
offering expected returns that are higher in absolute terms than the underlying
asset and, more importantly, the magnitude of expected option returns increases
with their inherent leverage. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that op-
tions across different maturities tend to offer significantly different returns, mainly
because of the different horizons associated with the underlying distributions used
to price them and the differences in the options’ relative time-value (see, e.g.,
Constantinides et al., 2013).
Consequently, the first change to the original methodology of the cross-sectional
dispersion of asset returns (used in equity markets by Christie and Huang, 1995,
Chang et al., 2000, Chiang and Zheng, 2010, Galariotis et al., 2014) is that mea-
sures of cross-sectional dispersion of option returns have to refer to contracts with
similar characteristics in terms of option type (calls versus puts), moneyness and
5Chang et al. (2000) propose the Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation (CSAD) measure while
Christie and Huang (1995) and Chiang and Zheng (2010) suggest an alternative measure of
dispersion, based on the Cross-Sectional Standard Deviation (CSSD). Both measures of cross-
sectional dispersion are fairly similar, with Chang et al. (2000) motivating their use of absolute
deviations by a lower sensitivity to outliers compared to CSSD .
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maturity. To this end, we focus only on short-term options on individual stocks,
which tend to be more liquid than longer-term contracts, and group them ac-
cording to their moneyness, separately for calls and puts. In addition, with the
objective of selecting the appropriate proxy for the market consensus, we use the
returns of the respective index options for each particular option group (same type,
short-term, and same moneyness).
Overall, our methodology is based on examining herding separately across two
option types (calls and puts) and three levels of moneyness for a total of six
option groups. First, on each trading day, we select the nearest-to-maturity index
option contracts, as long as they have at least one week to expiration. We then
identify one index option contract for each of three target levels of moneyness,
namely OTM (with absolute deltas equal to 0.25), At-The-Money (ATM, absolute
deltas equal to 0.50) and In-The-Money (ITM, absolute deltas equal to 0.75),
separately for calls and puts. For each of the six target index options, we calculate
the respective individual equity option returns by identifying, for each individual
underlying asset, the short-term option contract with the same option-type and
moneyness.6 We subsequently explore herding in equity options by computing the
cross-sectional absolute deviation (CSAD) for each group as
CSADcp,m,Mt =
∑N
i=1 |Rcp,m,Mi,t −Rcp,m,Mmkt,t |
N − 1 (1)
where Rcp,m,Mmkt,t is the daily arithmetic return at time t of an index option of type
cp, moneyness m, and maturity M . The length N of the cross-section of indi-
vidual options varies both across groups and across time within the same group
(subscripts have been suppressed for notational convenience).
Similarly to previous studies that focused on the equity market (Chang et al.,
2000; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Galariotis et al., 2014), our measure of herding
is given by the relationship between CSAD and index option returns, and not
by the unconditional level of CSAD . Chang et al. (2000) show that, under the
moderate assumption of expected stock returns being determined by the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), CSAD in stock returns is positively linearly related
to the absolute spot index return. We follow a similar approach to show that,
under the additional assumption of expected option returns being determined by
the Black and Scholes (1973) model, CSAD in option returns is positively linearly
related to the absolute index option return (see the Appendix).
6Regarding options leverage in particular, we select individual options with the same money-
ness (by using the option delta) as that of the target index option in that group, as long as they
are within 7.25% in either direction from the target delta of the index option. If a particular
stock does not have an option with a delta close enough to that of the index option, then it does
not enter the cross-section of option returns on that day.
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We test for the presence of herding effects by regressing the cross-sectional
dispersion against index option returns and a set of variables HerdV ariablest
that characterize periods of market stress, as given in (2).
CSADcp,m,Mt = α + β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+BHerdHerdV ariablest + t
(2)
where Dt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the index option
return Rcp,m,Mmkt,t is negative and the value of zero otherwise, in order to allow for
asymmetric effects in up and down (option) markets. Also, DLt (D
U
t ) is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the index option return on a given day
is located in the 5% lower (upper) tail of the distribution, and zero otherwise.7
The herd variables are computed at the aggregate market level and they consist
of volatility risk, skewness risk, trading volume, open interest, macroeconomic
announcements, crisis periods, dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the spot
index return and the cross-sectional dispersion observed in the underlying equity
market. Option-specific subscripts have been suppressed in all dummy variables,
as well as in the random error term, for notational convenience.
Under the null hypothesis of no herding, CSAD should be positively related to
positive index option returns and negatively related to negative ones (β1 > 0 and
β2 < 0). Furthermore, given the strictly linear relationship between dispersion
and index option returns, the null of no herding predicts that the coefficients of
the non-linear returns terms should be equal to zero (β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = 0).
Finally, if investors price individual stocks using the CAPM and individual stock
options using the Black and Scholes (1973) model, then the herd variables should
not have an impact on CSAD so, under the null of no herding, the vector BHerd
should consist of coefficients that are not different from zero. Moreover, even if the
CAPM and the Black and Scholes (1973) model are not the actual models used
to price assets, the coefficients in BHerd would still be expected to be zero under
the null of no herding as long as the herd variables do not constitute systematic
factors that are priced in the cross-section of expected returns (to the best of our
knowledge, none of these factors has been previously found to be a priced state
variable).
7The two additional dummies for extreme down and up market movements were first pro-
posed by Christie and Huang (1995). All subsequent empirical tests have also be run at the
alternative 2.5% and 1% tails for the DLt and D
U
t dummy variables. The (unreported) results
of these analyses are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the results presented here, and
also consistent with the empirical literature.
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We define violations of the above nulls as evidence of herding. Similarly to
Chang et al. (2000), we define strong herding as the case there CSAD decreases
with the magnitude of index option returns (β1 < 0 and/or β2 > 0) and moderate
herding as the case where CSAD increases with absolute index option returns but
at a decreasing rate (β3 < 0 and/or β4 < 0). Similarly to Christie and Huang
(1995), we define herding in extreme market conditions as the case where CSAD
is significantly lower when the returns of the index option are in the tails of their
distribution (β5 < 0 and/or β6 < 0). Finally, we define as conditional herding the
case where CSAD is significantly lower (than what would have been expected given
the index option return) during periods when our herd variables take particular
values (i.e. coefficients in BHerd being significant). Overall, a lower conditional
expectation of CSAD in periods of market stress would imply that individual
option returns tend to cluster around the market consensus more closely than
what the index option return would suggest during specific states of the market.
3 Data
We use the OptionMetrics database, which covers the entire US equity options
market, from January 1996 to December 2012. The dataset contains daily prices
of option contracts written both on individual stocks and on the S&P 500 index.
The options data includes, among other fields, daily best bid and best ask quotes,
implied volatilities (IV), trading volume, open interest and option Greeks. Op-
tion prices are computed as the midpoint of the best bid and the best ask quote.
The data on the underlying stocks are from CRSP, and they include closing daily
prices, adjusted returns and trading volume, among other fields. Analysts’ earnings
forecasts data are from the Thomson I/B/E/S database. The dates of US macroe-
conomic announcements were obtained from Bloomberg and checked against the
minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the US Bureau of
Labour Statistics (BLS), available on their respective websites.
We apply several filters. First, we exclude all option contracts with zero bids or
asks, non-positive bid-ask spreads, and prices that violate standard no-arbitrage
bounds. Second, options with less than one week (five trading days) to maturity
are dropped from the dataset. Finally, options with a trading volume of less than
five contracts on a given day are filtered out to avoid liquidity issues. We use daily
returns to calculate our proxy for herding behaviour, i.e. the return dispersion
measure CSAD as given in Equation (1). It is important to mention that despite
the fact that a considerable part of the literature that examines option returns has
focused on monthly returns of options held to maturity (e.g., Goyal and Saretto,
2009), and to a lesser extent on weekly returns (e.g., Coval and Shumway, 2001),
we use daily returns when computing dispersion measures. The use of option
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returns computed at a higher frequency is dictated by our research question, since
herding effects are typically considered to be short-lived and unlikely to persist
for an entire week or a month. This rationale is also evident from the fact that
the literature on herding uses asset returns computed predominantly at a daily, or
even intra-daily, frequency.8
On each day of the sample period, we identify the set of index options as well
as all available options written on individual stocks. We only keep the nearest-to-
maturity options, which are more liquid than longer-term contracts, and compute
their daily option returns across the six option groups discussed in the previous
section. Thus, we calculate the dispersion measure on each trading day and for each
option group. The relatively few days when an index option of particular target
moneyness is not available are treated as missing observations for that option
group. As a result, the number of days for which dispersion can be computed
varies somewhat across the six option groups. Moreover, since it is not always
possible to find individual options with moneyness, measured by the option delta,
exactly equal to the target delta of each group, we keep only contracts with deltas
that do not deviate from the target delta by more than 0.0725 in either direction.
Whenever a particular individual option contract is not traded for two consecutive
days, we do not take into account the return of this option contract.
Figure 1 plots the time-series of daily index option returns across the six groups.
Figure 2 shows the resulting time-series of CSAD and Table 1 provides some
descriptive statistics.9
[Figure 1 around here]
[Figure 2 around here]
[Table 1 around here]
Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2 confirm the need to test for the presence of
herding effects separately for different option groups. Figure 1 shows that the
returns of index options vary significantly across different moneyness levels, with
OTM contracts offering the highest (absolute) returns and their ITM counterparts
offering the lowest, consistent with the Coval and Shumway (2001) results. Fur-
thermore, Table 1 and Figure 2 suggest that the cross-sectional dispersion also
varies across option groups, with CSAD increasing as we move from ITM to OTM
8For a more comprehensive discussion on alternative frequencies for computing option returns
see Broadie et al. (2009).
9All subsequent empirical tests are performed using Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviations and
Cross-Sectional Standard Deviations. However, we only report results for the CSAD measure,
because absolute deviations are less sensitive to outliers. Furthermore, results for CSSD are
virtually identical.
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contracts, mainly as a result of absolute index option returns also increasing in
the same direction.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Volatility Risk and Skewness Risk
We begin the empirical analysis by exploring whether CSAD is driven by factors
associated with periods of high uncertainty. The first two variables that we con-
sider are the volatility risk and skewness risk of the market. Volatility risk at the
market level is proxied by the daily returns of short-maturity Crash-Neutral Strad-
dles (CNS ) written on the S&P 500 index. More specifically, on each sample day
we construct a CNS by buying an ATM index call and an ATM index put, while
going short in a deep OTM index put (with a delta of -0.125). The long position
in ATM index options (straddle) is a very common volatility strategy with returns
being positively related to the underlying index’s future volatility, and it repre-
sents a natural candidate to proxy for volatility risk (Coval and Shumway, 2001;
Santa-Clara and Saretto, 2009). The short position in the deep OTM put protects
the straddle against large market crashes and it is intended to “orthogonalize”,
to the extent possible, the two risk factors by reducing the CNS ’s exposure to
skewness risk (Driessen and Maenhout, 2013).
We proxy skewness risk by the daily returns of Risk Reversals (RR). On each
trading day, we identify a deep OTM index call and a deep OTM index put (with
absolute deltas of 0.125). A RR is then constructed by buying the “more expen-
sive” option while selling the “cheaper” one. Any divergence between the prices of
these two options reflects the difference between the implied volatilities extracted
from the tails of the underlying’s distribution, thus the returns of the index RR
provide a natural proxy for market skewness risk (Bakshi et al., 2008). For our
sample in particular, deep OTM index puts predominantly trade at a higher price
than equally OTM index calls, implying a negatively skewed risk-neutral distribu-
tion.
We examine the relationship between cross-sectional dispersion of option re-
turns and the volatility risk and skewness risk of the market (reflected in daily
returns of CNS and RR, respectively) by estimating Equation (3), with the re-
sults presented in Table 2. Statistical significance is established using Newey and
West (1987) Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard
errors.
10
CSADcp,m,Mt = α + β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+ β7CNSt + β8RRt + t
(3)
[Table 2 around here]
Table 2 shows that the coefficient β1 (β2) of the linear term in up (down) mar-
kets is consistently positive (negative) and statistically significant. This indicates
that CSAD tends to increase with the absolute level of index option returns, con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions discussed in Section 2 and rejecting the
hypothesis of strong herding. The coefficients of signed squared returns (β3 and
β4) are significantly positive, suggesting that the CSAD of option returns is non-
linearly related to the level of index option returns. In addition, the coefficients β5
and β6 for index option returns on a given day falling in the lower and upper tails
of its distribution are positive, although not always significant. The latter find-
ings of a non-linear relationship between CSAD and index option returns stand
in contrast to the theoretical strictly linear relationship described in Section 2.
However, this result does not support the alternative hypothesis of herding either,
since the coefficients of the non-linear terms are positive, suggesting that investors
actually tend to diverge more strongly from the market consensus at a rate that
is increasing in that consensus’ magnitude, and significantly more so when that
consensus takes extreme values.10
The results are also consistent with the stylized fact of equity returns exhibit-
ing markedly different behaviour during down and up markets (Bekaert and Wu,
2000; Bollerslev et al., 2006). This asymmetric effect is evident from the fact that
the rate of CSAD increases, with respect to the magnitude of market returns, is
substantially higher during up markets (β1) compared to down markets (β2), with
the difference in (absolute) coefficients being statistically significant across all op-
tion groups. However, the asymmetry in the non-linear term is in the opposite
direction, since the down market coefficients (β4) are consistently and significantly
higher than those associated with up markets (β3). A final dimension of asymme-
try in the herding regression results refers to the fact that, while extreme negative
10As a robustness check, we also address the potential issue of diminished comparability of
option returns by computing the returns of leverage-adjusted option portfolios (following the
methodology of Constantinides et al., 2013). Thus, all empirical tests for herding effects presented
in this study have also been performed on leverage-adjusted option portfolio returns, for which
comparability concerns are substantially mitigated. The results are similar to those obtained
using conventional daily returns and are, thus, not reported for brevity but they are available
upon request.
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index option returns are not always significantly associated with high levels of
CSAD , extreme positive index option returns appear to result in a significantly
higher cross-sectional dispersion.
Overall, the extent to which investors in the options market diverge from the
consensus increases as the magnitude of index option returns increases. This find-
ing is consistent with theoretical predictions and it stands in contrast to the hy-
pothesis of herding. However, the positive relationship between returns’ dispersion
and the index option returns magnitude seems to be somewhat weaker during down
markets. In other words, investors seem to be paying relatively more attention to
negative returns of index options, as opposed to positive ones, when pricing indi-
vidual stock options, although they are still found not to herd in either case.
In relation to variables associated with periods of market stress, Table 2 reports
evidence that there is a negative relationship between CSAD and our proxy for
market volatility risk. The coefficient β7 of daily CNS returns is negative and
statistically significant across all six option groups. The negative CNS coefficient
can be interpreted as an increase in the investors’ tendency to follow the market
consensus during periods of high volatility risk, and it represents the first set of
evidence of a potential herding behaviour in the option market.
Regarding skewness risk, results from estimating a specification of Equation
(2) where RR is the only risk factor added to the “basic” model (unreported),
suggest that CSAD is significantly negatively related to skewness risk (or “down-
ward jump” risk) across all option groups. On the face of it, such a finding would
translate to investors following the market instead of trading on their private in-
formation sets during periods characterized by high expected negative skewness or
increased risk aversion to skewness risk or, most likely, both. However, as can be
seen from Table 2, when both CNS and RR returns are included in the specifica-
tion described in Equation (3), the impact of skewness risk on CSAD is found to
be statistically insignificant (with the exception of OTM puts). This is somewhat
surprising since, as was previously mentioned, the crash-neutral element of strad-
dles should have “orthogonalized” them to skewness risk. Furthermore, the two
factors are only weakly correlated (the correlation coefficient is -0.08). Neverthe-
less, based on these results we proceed to include only volatility risk, proxied by
CNS returns, as an additional explanatory variable in the extended specification
henceforth, since it appears to subsume information contained in the skewness risk
factor.
It is important to mention, before continuing with our analysis of systematic
factors related to periods of market stress, that we also examine (in unreported
results) whether idiosyncratic characteristics of option contracts (e.g., option trad-
ing volume, implied volatility and open interest of each option contract group) and
features of underlying assets (e.g., stock trading volume, stock CAPM betas, his-
12
torical volatility, number of analysts, and forecast dispersions for each underlying
stock) are related to option herding behaviour. In particular, we examine whether
specific features of option contracts or their underlying assets are associated with
herding effects by sorting option contracts into portfolios, based on each partic-
ular characteristic. For instance, we repeat the same analysis reported in Table
2, but performed individually for five portfolios sorted by the implied volatility
level of the contracts used in each group. We repeat the same procedure with
all characteristics of individual option contracts and features of the underlying
asset. Nevertheless, we do not find any evidence that characteristics of each indi-
vidual option contract and each underlying asset affect the tendency of investors
to herd (or not) in option markets (these results are available from the authors
upon request).
4.2 Index Option Trading Volume and Open Interest
It would be reasonable to assume that the open interest and trading volume of
index options may be related to investors’ tendency to follow the market. For
instance, trading activity should be related to liquidity shocks and informational
events, while open interest has been used in empirical studies as a proxy for di-
vergences of opinion (Bessembinder et al., 1996; and Girma and Mougou, 2002),
information flows (Chuang-Chang et al., 2009), information processing (Donders
et al., 2000) and informed trading (Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992). Thus, as a
first step, we adopt various approaches to test whether trading volume and open
interest in index options can explain a potential tendency of investors to follow
the consensus instead of their own beliefs.
The first test involves splitting the full sample (across each moneyness group)
into two subsamples according to whether the trading volume of the corresponding
index options is below or above its 20-day moving average and then estimating
the model in Equation (3), separately for each subsample. We also perform an
extended full-sample regression which includes CNS returns and index options’
trading volume as additional explanatory variables in the “basic” model. The
results suggest that cross-sectional dispersion is not significantly linearly related
to the level of the market’s trading volume, nor to whether this trading volume at
t is higher or lower than its moving average.
Despite the above inability of trading volume to explain CSAD , we find that
extreme levels of trading in index options are in fact strongly related to investors’
attitudes with respect to following (or deviating from) the market consensus. More
specifically, we extend the specification in (3) by adding two dummy variables,
namely Dvol,Lt and D
vol,U
t , which take the value of 1 if the trading volume in the
corresponding index options at t is located in the lower and upper 5% tails of
the distribution respectively, and the value of zero otherwise. We find that the
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coefficients of Dvol,Lt are negative and highly significant for all three put groups, as
well as for OTM calls. The fact that CSAD tends to be significantly lower during
periods of extremely low market trading volume, after accounting for the magni-
tude of market returns, is consistent with a herding effect whereby investors follow
the market consensus more closely when the level of trading (in periods of high
illiquidity problems) is substantially low. At the other end of the spectrum, cross-
sectional dispersion tends to be significantly higher during periods of extremely
high trading volume, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficients of the
upper-tail dummy variable Dvol,Ut . This finding is consistent across all moneyness
levels, for both calls and puts, suggesting that investors tend to diverge (instead of
herding) from the market consensus when the level of trading volume (presumably
with elevated information flows) is particularly high in the market.
It should be noted that endogeneity is a potential issue in our analysis of
the relationship between CSAD and index options’ trading volume. We interpret
the above findings as investors being more likely to herd when information flows
through trading volume at the market level are substantially decreased. However,
it is conceivable that causality might be running in the opposite direction. For
instance, it could be argued that larger divergence of beliefs (and, hence, larger
CSAD) could be the reason for (rather than the result of) increased trading volume.
Overall, the level of trading volume is not related to herding effects, but the
coefficients of the volume tail dummies indicate a strong herding behaviour during
extremely low trading volumes, especially in the case of puts. However, we find that
this impact of trading volume actually seems to be subsumed by the informational
content of open interest, as our next results suggest. When the daily changes
in open interest of index options is incorporated as an additional regressor, the
coefficients of both trading volume dummies become statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Moreover, the coefficients of the new variable OI are positive and
statistically significant for calls and puts, across all moneyness bins.
A possible explanation for this finding probably lies in the different informa-
tional contents of trading volume and open interest. On the one hand, trading
volume reflects the level of investors’ activity in buying and selling options, with-
out distinguishing between an exchange of existing contracts and the creation of
new ones. On the other hand, changes in open interest directly refer to investors’
willingness to open new positions in the options market, which is more directly
associated with information flows. With this distinction in mind, our empirical
results suggest that herding is significantly more pronounced when open interest
decreases, i.e. when investors tend to close their positions in index options as op-
posed to opening new ones. Such behaviour is independent of the level of trading
volume, which could either increase or decrease in this case, and it seems to sub-
sume the explanatory power of extreme movements in the level of option trading
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activity.
Furthermore, we explore whether the relationship between cross-sectional dis-
persion and changes in index options’ open interest has a non-linear element. Thus,
we extend the analysis by constructing two dummy variables to capture extremely
low (large negative) or high (large positive) changes of open interest in index op-
tions, with DOI,Lt (D
OI,U
t ) taking the value of 1 if changes in the open interest at
t falls in the distribution’s lower (upper) 5% tail, and the value of zero otherwise.
This extended specification is given in Equation (4), and the results are presented
in Table 3.
CSADcp,m,Mt = α + β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+ β7CNSt + β8OIt + β9D
OI,L
t + β10D
OI,U
t + t
(4)
After including DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t in the extended specification, the coefficient
of open interest remains positive and statistically significant. In addition, the co-
efficients of both dummies are significantly negative across all option groups, with
herding being significantly more likely when changes in index options’ open inter-
est are extremely low or high. This finding can be interpreted as investors tending
to suppress their own views in favour of the market consensus during periods when
new positions in index options are opened, or existing positions are closed, at par-
ticularly large quantities. Finally, this herding effect is more pronounced for OTM
options compared to their ATM and ITM counterparts.
[Table 3 around here]
4.3 Macroeconomic Announcements and Crises
A number of previous studies have documented important changes in the trading
activity around news releases due to the uncertainty that may be generated by such
events (see for instance Boyd et al., 2005, and Savor and Wilson, 2013). Thus,
we examine whether the timing of US macroeconomic announcements can explain
investors’ herding behaviour, in excess of the impact of the previously discussed
factors.
We consider the scheduled monthly announcements from the Federal Open
Market Committee’s (FOMC) meetings and the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS)
as our news release events. The FOMC normally meets on pre-scheduled dates
eight times a year, and these meetings’ minutes are made available to the public
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shortly afterwards.11 We use the dates of the minutes’ publication as the relevant
macroeconomic announcement dates. In addition, once a month (normally on a
Friday) the BLS publishes the US unemployment rate along with other related
data, such as the total number of employed and its regional distribution.
In order to test for the presence of herding effects during macroeconomic an-
nouncement dates, we estimate an extended specification which includes a dummy
variable Dmacrot that takes the value of 1 on announcement dates (FOMC or BLS),
and the value of zero otherwise. The coefficients of the dummy variable for macroe-
conomic announcement dates are consistently negative and statistically significant
for both calls and puts, indicating that herding is more likely on these dates. For
instance, CSAD in OTM puts is on average lower by 0.17% during macroeconomic
announcement dates, as given by the estimated β11, suggesting that investors tend
to herd around the market consensus on future downward movements of the un-
derlying index more closely when FOMC and BLS release macroeconomic data.
Overall, our results are consistent with a significant herding effect during dates of
US macroeconomic announcements, with investors being more inclined to follow
the market consensus and, as a result, cross-sectional dispersion of option returns
being lower than would have been otherwise expected.
Other sources of market stress periods that may induce herding effects are
economic crises. For example, Chiang and Zheng (2010) examine the impact of a
number of crises (1994 Mexican crisis, 1997 Asian crisis, 1999 Argentinean crisis
and 2008 US financial crisis) on investors’ tendency to herd, finding that turbulent
periods are associated with moderate herding in the country of origin as well as
in neighbouring markets. In the same vein, we explore whether investors in the
US options market tended to follow the market’s lead more closely than expected
during the dot-com bubble collapse at the beginning of the past decade and the
2008 financial crisis, by extending the specification with two crisis dummies. The
first dummy variable Dcr.dotcomt takes the value of 1 during the dot-com bubble
collapse, i.e. from March 2000 to August 2002, and the value of zero otherwise.
Similarly, the dummy variable Dcr.subprimet takes the value of 1 during the recent
financial crisis, i.e. from September 2007 to March 2009, and the value of zero
otherwise.12 The new specification, extended for macroeconomic announcements
11The FOMC reviews economic and financial conditions, determines the appropriate stance
of monetary policy, and assesses the risks to its long-run goals of price stability and sustainable
economic growth. The FOMC consists of twelve members: the seven members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and four of the remaining eleven Reserve Bank presidents, who serve one-year terms on a
rotating basis.
12Given that defining the exact period of a particular crisis represents a notoriously difficult
task, we have adopted two commonly used windows for the dot-com bubble burst and the financial
crisis of 2008. The subsequent analysis has also been performed under narrower and wider
windows, obtaining similar results which are not reported for brevity. Furthermore, despite the
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and crisis periods, is given in (5) and the results are reported in Table 4.
CSADcp,m,Mt = α + β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+ β7CNSt + β8OIt + β9D
OI,L
t + β10D
OI,U
t
+ β11D
macro
t + β12D
cr.dotcom
t + β13D
cr.subprime
t + t
(5)
Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficients of Dcr.dotcomt are positive across all op-
tion groups, implying that cross-sectional dispersion was in fact higher than ex-
pected and herding was less pronounced during the dot-com bubble collapse. How-
ever, these coefficients are significant only for ATM options. On the other hand,
the coefficients of Dcr.subprimet are negative and statistically significant across all
groups, suggesting that CSAD was significantly lower than expected and, thus,
herding was more likely during the financial crisis of 2008, after accounting for the
impact of the previously discussed systematic factors. This finding is consistent
with the moderate herding effect observed during the same period in the US eq-
uity market reported by Chiang and Zheng (2010). A potential explanation for
the different results regarding the two crisis periods is that herding effects may
be triggered depending on the magnitude and nature of the crisis. The dot-com
bubble burst represented a crisis that was more industry-focused and less system-
atic, while the 2008 crisis was essentially a global one with an impact across most
sectors and countries.
[Table 4 around here]
4.4 Dispersion of Analysts’ Forecasts
The next systematic factor that we consider represents a more direct proxy for
the level of uncertainty about the future performance of the underlying assets
at the aggregate market level. On each trading day, we collect the dispersion of
analysts’ forecasts for each stock in the entire US equity market. Each stock-
specific observation of the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts is normalized by the
reasonable consensus on the origins of the dot-com bubble collapse, the financial crisis of 2008
refers to a series of market events rather than a single one. More specifically, this (essentially
global) crisis originated in the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market which was then
followed by a credit crunch in the US financial market and then spread to financial markets
around the globe. Note that the subscript “subprime” of the respective dummy variable reflects
more the starting point of this crisis rather than its nature as a whole.
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respective stock’s mean forecast, in order to adjust for “level” differences, and thus
to have comparable observations. We then calculate the cross-sectional average of
all the stocks’ adjusted forecast dispersions (FD) at t as a proxy for investors’
uncertainty around the future performance of the aggregate equity market. We
include FD as an additional explanatory variable in our regression analysis:
CSADcp,m,Mt = α + β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+ β7CNSt + β8OIt + β9D
OI,L
t + β10D
OI,U
t
+ β11D
macro
t + β12D
cr.dotcom
t + β13D
cr.subprime
t + β14FDt + t
(6)
As can be seen from Table 5, the coefficients of FD are negative for all options,
and statistically significant in 4 out of the 6 option bins. Given that CSAD is sig-
nificantly lower when analysts’ forecast market dispersion is larger, investors seem
to herd more closely to the market consensus during periods of higher uncertainty
around the future prospects of the aggregate underlying market. Considering that
investors incorporate analysts’ forecasts in their information sets (presumably af-
fording them considerable weight) when making investment decisions, high levels
of FD are likely to be interpreted as indicative of less confidence about the ac-
curacy of the forecasted performance of the average stock. As a result, investors
could place a higher weight on the market consensus when making their investment
decisions under conditions of high uncertainty.
[Table 5 around here]
4.5 Dispersion of Returns in the Underlying Market
A number of previous studies have examined whether herding in a particular mar-
ket is affected by events in other markets (see, for instance, Chiang and Zheng,
2010; Klein, 2013; Galariotis et al., 2014). In a similar spirit, we proceed to explore
whether herding in the options market might be related to herding behavior in the
underlying stock market. To this end, we include in our regression analysis the
cross-sectional dispersion in the spot market CSADSt :
CSADcp,m,Mt = α+ β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t
+ β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β4Dt(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 + β5DLt + β6DUt
+ β7CNSt + β8OIt + β9D
OI,L
t + β10D
OI,U
t + β11D
macro
t + β12D
cr.dotcom
t
+ β13D
cr.subprime
t + β14FDt + β15CSAD
S
t + β16(R
S
mkt,t)
2 + t
(7)
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Here, CSADSt is the cross-sectional absolute deviation calculated with returns
of the underlying stock market, where the market consensus is proxied by the
returns of the S&P 500 index, RSmkt,t. Following Chiang and Zheng (2010), we
also incorporate the squared spot index return as an additional regressor to avoid
“level’ problems and to capture non-linear relationships with the option market.
Table 6 reports the results from estimating Equation (7).
[Table 6 around here]
The first point to notice is that including the cross-sectional dispersion and the
index return from the spot market in the herding specification does not change the
magnitude, sign and statistical significance of the other coefficients (β7 to β14). In
other words, activity in the spot equity market does not subsume the informational
content of the other systematic factors, which are still found to be associated with
significant herding effects in option returns.
It is interesting to observe that the coefficients of cross-sectional dispersion in
the spot market are found to be consistently negative across all groups, while sta-
tistically significant for all put groups and OTM calls. This negative relationship
stands in contrast to previous studies that have reported significant spillover ef-
fects in terms of herding between different markets at an inter-country level (see,
for instance, Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Mobarek et al., 2014). Instead of clustering
around the market consensus at the same times, the returns of individual options
in fact appear to be more clustered when the returns of stocks are more dispersed
(and vice versa).
The negative relationship between cross-sectional dispersions in the option
market and the underlying stock market can be explained through divergences
of investors’ opinions that may induce herding effects in the option market. As
described in the introduction, Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000)
do not find evidence of herding in the US equity market; therefore cross-sectional
dispersions in stocks, CSADSt , can be interpreted as a measure of divergence of
opinion amongst investors in relation to stocks’ performance, rather than herding
tendencies in the underling equity market. Hence, when there is a high value of
CSADSt , indicating discrepancies in investors’ beliefs, option investors seem to be
more likely to follow the market consensus, thus reducing the level of CSADcp,m,Mt .
4.6 Robustness Checks
As a robustness check, we estimate a modified version of the previous specification,
where all systematic factors are used in return form. Similarly to Galariotis et al.
(2014) and Mobarek et al. (2014), we use dummy variables multiplied with the
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index option’s squared return, replacing the factors that were previously expressed
as levels. More specifically, we create a dummy variable DOI<MAt that takes the
value of 1 when the index options’ open interest is lower than its 20-day moving
average, and the value of zero otherwise. We also use the dummy variable DFD>MAt
which takes the value of 1 when the cross-sectional average of forecast dispersions
is greater than its 20-day moving average, and the value of zero otherwise. These
variables are used to replace the OIt and FDt factors, respectively, from the spec-
ification in Equation (7). In addition, the dummy variables DOI,Lt , D
OI,U
t , D
macro
t ,
Dcr.dotcomt and D
cr.subprime
t are still incorporated in the modified specification in (8),
but now they are multiplied with the squared option market return. Lastly, the
variables CNSt, CSAD
S
t and (R
S
mkt,t)
2 are included in the same way as before,
since they are already expressed in terms of returns.
CSADcp,m,Mt = α+ β1(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t + β2DtRcp,m,Mmkt,t + β3(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2
+ β4Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 + β5D
L
t + β6D
U
t + β7CNSt + β8D
OI<MA
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2
+ β9D
OI,L
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 + β10D
OI,U
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 + β11D
macro
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2
+ β12D
cr.dotcom
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 + β13D
cr.subprime
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2
+ β14D
FD>MA
t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 + β15CSAD
S
t + β16(R
S
mkt,t)
2 + t
(8)
Table 7 reports the results from estimating Equation (8). The intuition behind
the estimated coefficients of the systematic factors is slightly different compared
to those in the previous specification. On the one hand, significantly negative
coefficients for the systematic factors in Equation (7) are interpreted as evidence
that CSADcp,m,Mt is lower than expected when these factors take high values (for
level variables) or during specific periods (for dummy variables), supporting the
hypothesis of herding in periods of market stress. On the other hand, significantly
negative coefficients for the systematic factors in the modified Equation (8) would
imply that CSADcp,m,Mt is not only lower, but that it also decreases as the (ab-
solute) index option return increases during specific states of the market. In this
setting, herding in option markets must be reflected in a low dispersion of indi-
vidual option returns during periods of market stress (as given by the systematic
factors), which should not be the case when the magnitude of index option return
increases (due to level issues, explained in Section 2).
[Table 7 around here]
The results support the hypothesis of herding for all of the systematic fac-
tors related to periods of market uncertainty. Cross-sectional dispersion is lower
when changes in index options’ open interest fall below its 20-day moving average,
with an additional impact when an extremely large number of option positions are
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closed, and these decreases in CSADcp,m,Mt are larger when coinciding with large
absolute index option returns. However, a similar effect is not evident for days
of extremely high open interest when, although CSADcp,m,Mt tends to be lower
than expected, it is not consistently decreasing with the magnitude of the market
consensus. The significantly negative β11 coefficients further suggest that the op-
tion return dispersion is lower when macroeconomic information is released, with
individual option returns clustering more closely when large market movements
are observed on those days. A similar relationship is found to characterize the
subprime crisis period (but not the dot-com bubble burst) as well as the periods
when analysts’ forecasts tend to be more dispersed. Overall, our findings support
the hypothesis of investors in the US options market herding under certain market
conditions, with the returns of individual options clustering around the market
consensus more closely than expected during these periods, and this clustering
being even stronger when index option returns are larger.
5 Conclusions
Cross-sectional dispersion quantifies the average proximity of individual assets’
returns to the market consensus. As such, it provides a useful measure of in-
vestors’ tendency to follow the market’s lead when trading in individual assets,
a tendency that is typically referred to as herding. We report significant herding
effects in option returns, using their cross-sectional dispersion, conditional on a set
of systematic factors related to periods of market stress.
In particular, herding appears to be driven primarily by market uncertainty
and periods of high information flows. Investors tend to herd more closely when
they face high volatility risk. Herding effects are also more pronounced during
periods when an extremely high number of option positions is closed or opened.
Finally, investors tend to follow the market consensus more closely than expected
on dates when significant information about the US economy is released, during
the financial crisis of 2008, as well as during periods when analysts’ forecasts about
the equity market’s future performance are more divergent.
This tendency to herd might be motivated by behavioural biases, but it could
also represent a rational element of the investment decision-making process, for
instance within the context of high costs of information and the fear for the loss
of reputation. Irrespective of the potential explanations, the presence of herding
effects carries significant implications for asset pricing and portfolio management.
When investors tend to trade in individual assets in the same direction as that of
the market, asset prices are bound to deviate from their fundamental values and a
larger number of securities are required in order to achieve the same diversification
benefits. In the case of options, herding has the additional implication of limiting
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the ability of market participants to hedge the risks associated with their positions
in the underlying equities, as well as to engage in leveraged speculation on these
assets.
Other interesting issues remain to be addressed. For instance, the study of
herding behaviour in other option markets, a similar analysis using other derivative
securities, and the design of a theoretical model of herding in option pricing are
left for future research.
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Appendix: The relationship between CSAD and
index option returns
The Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation (CSAD) of individual option returns (that
are comparable in terms of type, leverage and time-to-maturity) is expected to
increase linearly with the respective absolute index option return, i.e. the mag-
nitude of the market consensus. This relationship must hold under the relatively
mild assumption of asset prices following geometric Brownian motions. The first
derivative of CSAD with respect to the index option return can then be computed
using the continuous-time Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Merton (1971)
and the Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing framework.
Proposition. The Cross-Sectional Absolute Deviation of expected individual
European option returns (comparable in terms of type, leverage and time-to-
maturity) against the expected return of the respective index option is a positive
linear function of the expected index option return.
Proof. Let Rsi,t denote the return at t of the individual stock i, while R
s
mkt,t refers
to the market index return at t. Furthermore, let Rcp,m,Mi,t denote the return at
t of a European option of type cp, (c for call or p for put), moneyness m and
time-to-maturity M , written on the individual stock i (Rcp,m,Mmkt,t in the case of an
index option). We begin by making the following assumption
Assumption. Expected asset returns vary linearly with their respective market
betas. In the case of options, expected returns must satisfy the CAPM equation
E[Rcp,m,Mi,t ] = β
cp,m,M
i (E[R
s
mkt,t]−Rf,t) +Rf,t (A1)
where βcp,m,Mi is the option’s beta and Rf,t is the risk-free rate at t.
Option betas are a linear function of the underlying asset’s beta (Black and
Scholes, 1973; Jarrow and Rudd, 1983), given by
βcp,m,Mi = ω
cp,m,M
i,t β
s
i (A2)
where βsi is the market beta of the underlying asset i. The leverage inherent in
a particular option contract is given by the option’s Black and Scholes (BS) elas-
ticity ωcp,m,Mi,t =
∂E[Rcp,m,Mi,t ]
∂E[Rsi,t]
, which is simply equal to the option’s delta divided
by the option-to-stock price ratio. Note that all options in the cross-section,
as well as the index option, are assumed to have the same BS elasticity, i.e.
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ωcp,m,Mi,t = ω
cp,m,M
j,t = ω
cp,m,M
mkt,t = ω
cp,m,M
t , ∀i, j ∈ N . Given that βsmkt = 1 by
default, combining (A1) and (A2) allows us to express the expected return of an
individual option as
E[Rcp,m,Mi,t ] = ω
cp,m,M
t β
s
i (E[R
s
mkt,t]−Rf,t) +Rf,t
= ωcp,m,Mt β
s
mkt(E[R
s
mkt,t]−Rf,t)βsi +Rf,t
= βcp,m,Mmkt (E[R
s
mkt,t]−Rf,t)βsi +Rf,t
= [βcp,m,Mmkt (E[R
s
mkt,t]−Rf,t) +Rf,t]βsi − βsiRf,t +Rf,t
= E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]β
s
i − βsiRf,t +Rf,t (A3)
Now, consider a cross-section at time t of the expected returns of options (same
type, leverage, and time-to-maturity) written on N individual assets. The respec-
tive expected index option return represents the market consensus. We follow
the related herding literature and denote the cross-sectional absolute deviation of
expected option returns by ECSAD (first introduced for stocks by Chang et al.,
2000). This measure of cross-sectional dispersion at the level of expected returns
can be written as
ECSADcp,m,Mt =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
|E[Rcp,m,Mi,t ]− E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]|
=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
|E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]βsi − βsiRf,t +Rf,t − E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]|
=
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
|(βsi − 1)(E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t)|
=
∑N
i=1 |βsi − 1|
N − 1 × |E[R
cp,m,M
mkt,t ]−Rf,t| (A4)
The first derivative of ECSAD with respect to the expected index option re-
turn can be easily computed by distinguishing between positive and negative excess
returns of index options.
Case 1. E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t > 0
In the case of positive expected excess returns of index options, the term inside
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the absolute bars in (A4) is positive, and the first derivative of ECSAD can be
computed as
∂ECSADcp,m,Mt
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
=
∑N
i=1 |βsi − 1|
N − 1 ×
∂(E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t)
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
=
∑N
i=1 |βsi − 1|
N − 1 > 0 (A5)
Case 2. E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t < 0
In the case of negative expected excess returns of index options, the term inside
the absolute bars in (A4) is negative, and the first derivative of ECSAD can be
computed as
∂ECSADcp,m,Mt
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
=
∑N
i=1 |βsi − 1|
N − 1 ×
∂(Rf,t − E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ])
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
= −
∑N
i=1 |βsi − 1|
N − 1 < 0 (A6)
Summing up, for both calls and puts, the first derivative of ECSAD with re-
spect to index option returns is positive (negative) when the index option return
in positive (negative). Equivalently, ECSAD is expected to increase with the ab-
solute magnitude of index option returns.
∂ECSADcp,m,Mt
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
{
> 0 if E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t > 0
< 0 if E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]−Rf,t < 0
Finally, it is straightforward to see that the second derivative is equal to zero
∂2ECSADcp,m,Mt
∂E[Rcp,m,Mmkt,t ]
2 = 0
for both calls and puts, and irrespective of the index option return’s sign, so the
above relationship between ECSADcp,m,Mt and E[R
cp,m,M
mkt,t ] is linear.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Cross-Sectional Dispersion (CSAD)
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
Mean 0.18 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.10
Median 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.07
St.Dev 0.17 0.1 0.06 0.18 0.11 0.09
Skewness 5.17 3.65 2.93 14.57 3.23 6.64
Min 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
Max 2.86 1.60 0.83 6.57 1.22 2.39
Obs 3,691 3,675 3,692 3,752 3,667 3,575
Notes: This Table reports descriptive statistics of the daily time-series of Cross-Sectional
Dispersion (CSAD) measures, which are computed as
CSADcp,m,Mt =
∑N
i=1 |Rcp,m,Mi,t −Rcp,m,Mmkt,t |
N−1
where Rcp,m,Mi,t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t ) is the daily arithmetic return at time t of an option written on the
individual stock i (on the market index) with type cp, moneyness m, and maturity M, while
N is the number of individual stocks for which option returns are available at t. Statistics are
tabulated separately for calls and puts, across three different moneyness levels, namely OTM,
ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). The sample period
runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Table 2: Herding Regressions - Volatility Risk and Skewness Risk
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0469* 0.0273* 0.0232* 0.0362* 0.0226* 0.0172*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2916* 0.2872* 0.2598* 0.2835* 0.2817* 0.2819*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1678* -0.2098* -0.1971* -0.1889* -0.2139* -0.2309*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0123* 0.0139* 0.0349* 0.0057* 0.0182* 0.0166*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1377* 0.1194* 0.1342* 0.1308* 0.1287* 0.1078*
DLt 0.0163* 0.0012 0.0011 0.0119* 0.0016 0.0104*
DUt 0.0341* 0.0345* 0.0218* 0.0480* 0.0301* 0.0270*
CNSt -0.0933* -0.0438* -0.0269* -0.0644* -0.0486* -0.0415*
RRt 0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0013 -0.0030* -0.0024 -0.0001
AdjR2 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.95
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of
zero otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index
option return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution,
and the value of zero otherwise. The CNSt and RRt factor-mimicking portfolios proxy for
volatility risk and skewness risk, respectively. The regression results are presented separately
for calls and puts, across three different moneyness levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM
(with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). The Table reports the estimated
coefficients, their statistical significance, and the Adjusted R2. Statistical significance at the
5% level is denoted by *, and it is based on Newey and West (1987) HAC standard errors.
The sample runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Table 3: Herding Regressions - Index Options’ Trading Volume and Open Interest
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0264* 0.0147* 0.0154* 0.0198* 0.0098* 0.0069*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2750* 0.2758* 0.2500* 0.2757* 0.2709* 0.2784*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1739* -0.2141* -0.1969* -0.1800* -0.2121* -0.2268*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0132* 0.0154* 0.0371* 0.0057* 0.0185* 0.0163*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1092* 0.0799* 0.1008* 0.1145* 0.1007* 0.0898*
DLt 0.0098* 0.0039 0.0032 0.0069 0.0006 0.0062*
DUt 0.0288* 0.0264* 0.0180* 0.0371* 0.0262* 0.0227*
CNSt -0.0422* -0.0097* -0.0076* -0.0275* -0.0152* -0.0193*
OIt 0.0056* 0.0036* 0.0022* 0.0046* 0.0037* 0.0027*
DOI,Lt -0.0326* -0.0232* -0.0154* -0.0247* -0.0223* -0.0165*
DOI,Ut -0.0183* -0.0135* -0.0079* -0.0173* -0.0148* -0.0112*
AdjR2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of zero
otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index option
return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution, and
the value of zero otherwise. The term CNSt is a measure of volatility risk. The variable OIt
refers to the index options’ open interest at t (measured in millions). The dummy variables
DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t take the value of 1 if the open interest of index options at t is located in
the distribution’s lower and upper 5% tail, respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The
regression results are presented separately for calls and puts, across three different moneyness
levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively).
The Table reports the estimated coefficients, their statistical significance, and the Adjusted
R2. Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *, and it is based on Newey and
West (1987) HAC standard errors. The sample runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Table 4: Herding Regressions - Macroeconomic Announcements and Crises
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0242* 0.0129* 0.0142* 0.0177* 0.0081* 0.0057*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2752* 0.2760* 0.2502* 0.2755* 0.2708* 0.2782*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1726* -0.2131* -0.1962* -0.1797* -0.2117* -0.2266*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0131* 0.0153* 0.0369* 0.0057* 0.0185* 0.0163*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1117* 0.0814* 0.1020* 0.1148* 0.1012* 0.0901*
DLt 0.0091* 0.0038 0.0031 0.0070 0.0006 0.0061*
DUt 0.0282* 0.0263* 0.0179* 0.0374* 0.0262* 0.0226*
CNSt -0.0420* -0.0099* -0.0077* -0.0275* -0.0153* -0.0191*
OIt 0.0060* 0.0039* 0.0023* 0.0050* 0.0040* 0.0029*
DOI,Lt -0.0304* -0.0214* -0.0143* -0.0226* -0.0207* -0.0153*
DOI,Ut -0.0203* -0.0150* -0.0087* -0.0191* -0.0162* -0.0122*
Dmacrot -0.0021* -0.0011* -0.0010* -0.0017* -0.0008* -0.0008*
Dcr.dotcomt 0.0053 0.0047* 0.0032 0.0054 0.0040* 0.0029
Dcr.subprimet -0.0078* -0.0040* -0.0016* -0.0055* -0.0047* -0.0040*
AdjR2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of zero
otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index option
return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution, and
the value of zero otherwise. The term CNSt is a measure of volatility risk. The variable OIt
refers to the index options’ open interest at t (measured in millions). The dummy variables
DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t take the value of 1 if the open interest of index options at t is located in the
distribution’s lower and upper 5% tail, respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Dmacrot takes the value of 1 on dates of US macroeconomic announcements, and the
value of 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Dcr.dotcomt and D
cr.subprime
t take the value of 1
during the dot-com bubble collapse (March 2000 to August 2002) and the US subprime crisis
(September 2007 to March 2009), respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The regression
results are presented separately for calls and puts, across three different moneyness levels,
namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). The
Table reports the estimated coefficients, their statistical significance, and the Adjusted R2.
Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *, and it is based on Newey and West
(1987) HAC standard errors. The sample runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Table 5: Herding Regressions - Dispersion of Analysts’ Forecasts
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0254* 0.0134* 0.0160* 0.0167* 0.0058* 0.0046*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2751* 0.2759* 0.2498* 0.2755* 0.2709* 0.2784*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1725* -0.2131* -0.1961* -0.1796* -0.2116* -0.2268*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0131* 0.0154* 0.0370* 0.0057* 0.0186* 0.0163*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1116* 0.0814* 0.1023* 0.1151* 0.1021* 0.0903*
DLt 0.0091* 0.0037 0.0029 0.0070 0.0005 0.0060*
DUt 0.0284* 0.0263* 0.0180* 0.0374* 0.0261* 0.0226*
CNSt -0.0418* -0.0098* -0.0074* -0.0276* -0.0157* -0.0193*
OIt 0.0061* 0.0039* 0.0025* 0.0049* 0.0037* 0.0028*
DOI,Lt -0.0315* -0.0219* -0.0158* -0.0217* -0.0188* -0.0144*
DOI,Ut -0.0209* -0.0152* -0.0096* -0.0186* -0.0151* -0.0117*
Dmacrot -0.0021* -0.0011* -0.0009* -0.0017* -0.0009* -0.0009*
Dcr.dotcomt 0.0060 0.0050* 0.0041 0.0048 0.0028* 0.0024
Dcr.subprimet -0.0079* -0.0041* -0.0018* -0.0054* -0.0045* -0.0039*
FDt -0.0010 -0.0004* -0.0014* -0.0008* -0.0018 -0.0008*
AdjR2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of zero
otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index option
return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution, and
the value of zero otherwise. The term CNSt is a measure of volatility risk. The variable OIt
refers to the index options’ open interest at t (measured in millions). The dummy variables
DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t take the value of 1 if the open interest of index options at t is located in the
distribution’s lower and upper 5% tail, respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Dmacrot takes the value of 1 on dates of US macroeconomic announcements, and the
value of 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Dcr.dotcomt and D
cr.subprime
t take the value of 1
during the dot-com bubble collapse (March 2000 to August 2002) and the US subprime crisis
(September 2007 to March 2009), respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The variable
FDt refers to the mean (normalized) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the cross-section of
underlying stocks at t. The regression results are presented separately for calls and puts,
across three different moneyness levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of
0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). The Table reports the estimated coefficients, their statistical
significance, and the Adjusted R2. Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *, and
it is based on Newey and West (1987) HAC standard errors. The sample runs from January
1996 to December 2012.
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Table 6: Herding Regressions - Underlying CSAD and Index return
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0357* 0.0192* 0.0194* 0.0301* 0.0126* 0.0108*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2780* 0.2801* 0.2545* 0.2796* 0.2757* 0.2834*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1728* -0.2149* -0.1998* -0.1781* -0.2126* -0.2310*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0126* 0.0144* 0.0356* 0.0055* 0.0181* 0.0154*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1171* 0.0872* 0.1049* 0.1242* 0.1085* 0.0904*
DLt 0.0088* 0.0031 0.0028 0.0063 -0.0002 0.0057*
DUt 0.0286* 0.0265* 0.0183* 0.0364* 0.0255* 0.0218*
CNSt -0.0325* -0.0024* -0.0039* -0.0188* -0.0090* -0.0138*
OIt 0.0059* 0.0038* 0.0025* 0.0047* 0.0036* 0.0027*
DOI,Lt -0.0325* -0.0228* -0.0164* -0.0227* -0.0196* -0.0149*
DOI,Ut -0.0159* -0.0107* -0.0069* -0.0131* -0.0106* -0.0085*
Dmacrot -0.0017* -0.0007* -0.0007* -0.0012* -0.0005* -0.0006*
Dcr.dotcomt 0.0098 0.0074* 0.0056 0.0097 0.0055* 0.0048
Dcr.subprimet -0.0028* 0.0002* 0.0008* 0.0005* -0.0001* -0.0004*
FDt -0.0027 -0.0014* -0.0020* -0.0014* 0.0006 -0.0002*
CSADSt -0.3544* -0.1988 -0.1201 -0.4609* -0.2388* -0.2278*
(RSmkt,t)
2 -3.4441 -5.5684 -3.6008 -3.0896 -4.8756 -2.6152
AdjR2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of zero
otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index option
return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution, and
the value of zero otherwise. The term CNSt is a measure of volatility risk. The variable OIt
refers to the index options’ open interest at t (measured in millions). The dummy variables
DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t take the value of 1 if the open interest of index options at t is located in
the distribution’s lower and upper 5% tail, respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The
dummy variable Dmacrot takes the value of 1 on dates of US macroeconomic announcements,
and the value of 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Dcr.dotcomt and D
cr.subprime
t take the
value of 1 during the dot-com bubble collapse (March 2000 to August 2002) and the US
subprime crisis (September 2007 to March 2009), respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise.
The variable FDt refers to the mean (normalized) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the
cross-section of underlying stocks at t. The variables CSADSt and R
S
mkt,t denote the cross-
sectional dispersion and the index return, respectively, of the underlying equity market. The
regression results are presented separately for calls and puts, across three different moneyness
levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively).
The Table reports the estimated coefficients, their statistical significance, and the Adjusted
R2. Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *, and it is based on Newey and
West (1987) HAC standard errors. The sample runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Table 7: Herding Regressions - Systematic Dummies Times Squared Returns
Calls Puts
moneyness OTM ATM ITM OTM ATM ITM
constant 0.0799* 0.0458* 0.0331* 0.0652* 0.0429* 0.0323*
(1−Dt)Rcp,m,Mmkt,t 0.2920 0.2838* 0.2569* 0.2789* 0.2895* 0.2922*
DtR
cp,m,M
mkt,t -0.1681* -0.2090* -0.2094* -0.1767* -0.2241* -0.2426*
(1−Dt)(Rcp,m,Mmkt,t )2 0.0145* 0.0438* 0.0923* 0.0318* 0.0423* 0.0431*
Dt(R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.1555* 0.1359* 0.1310* 0.1757* 0.1498* 0.1257*
DLt 0.0113* 0.0045 0.0066 0.0072 0.0004 0.0055*
DUt 0.0313* 0.0191* 0.0127* 0.0310* 0.0218* 0.0204*
CNSt -0.0482* -0.0308* -0.0163* -0.0331* -0.0224* -0.0220*
DOI<MAt (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.0004 -0.0108* -0.0211* -0.0142* -0.0187* -0.0193*
DOI,Lt (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 -0.0761* -0.1391* -0.1941* -0.0449* -0.0761* -0.1615*
DOI,Ut (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.0070 0.0277* 0.0417* -0.0049* 0.0059 -0.0284*
Dmacrot (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 -0.0049* -0.0027* -0.0013* -0.0097* -0.0092* -0.0015*
Dcr.dotcomt (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.0101* 0.0243* 0.0521* 0.0162* 0.0212* 0.0333*
Dcr.subprimet (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 -0.0095* -0.0214* -0.0390* -0.0098* -0.0176* -0.0207*
DFD>MAt (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t )
2 0.0000 -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0121* -0.0102* -0.0095*
CSADSt -1.5948* -0.8537* -0.4821* -1.3305* -1.0322* -0.7793*
(RSmkt,t)
2 4.7524 -4.6994 -5.3847 3.1780 -1.0100 -0.8470
AdjR2 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97
Notes: This Table reports the results of regressing the Cross-Sectional Dispersion CSAD
against a set of exogenous variables. The return of the respective option written on the
market index with type cp, moneyness m and maturity M is denoted by Rcp,m,Mmkt,t . The dummy
variable Dt takes the value of 1 if the index option return at t is negative and the value of
zero otherwise. The dummy variables DLt and D
U
t take the value of 1 if the respective index
option return at t is located in the 5% lower and upper tail, respectively, of the distribution,
and the value of 0 otherwise. The term CNSt is a measure of volatility risk. The variable
DOI<MAt takes the value of 1 if the index options’ open interest at t is lower than its 30-
day moving average, and the value of 0 otherwise. The variables DOI,Lt and D
OI,U
t take the
value of 1 if the open interest of index options at t is located in the distribution’s lower and
upper 5% tail, respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Dmacrot takes
the value of 1 on dates of US macroeconomic announcements, and the value of 0 otherwise.
The dummy variables Dcr.dotcomt and D
cr.subprime
t take the value of 1 during the dot-com
bubble collapse (March 2000 to August 2002) and the US subprime crisis (September 2007
to March 2009), respectively, and the value of 0 otherwise. The variable DFD>MAt takes the
value of 1 if the mean (normalized) dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in the cross-section of
underlying stocks at t is greater than its 30-day moving average, and that of 0 otherwise.
The variables CSADSt and R
S
mkt,t denote the cross-sectional dispersion and the index return,
respectively, of the underlying equity market. The regression results are presented separately
for calls and puts, across three different moneyness levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM. The
Table reports the estimated coefficients, their statistical significance, and the Adjusted R2.
Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by *, and it is based on Newey and West
(1987) HAC standard errors. The sample runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Figure 1: Time-Series of Daily Index Option Returns
Notes: This Figure plots the time-series of daily returns of options written on the S&P 500
index. The upper panel refers to calls and the lower panel to puts. Each subplot refers to
different moneyness levels, namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and
0.75, respectively). The sample period runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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Figure 2: Time-Series of Daily Cross-Sectional Dispersion
Notes: This Figure plots the daily time-series of Cross-Sectional Dispersion (CSAD) of options
written on individual stocks around the index option return. CSAD is computed as
CSADcp,m,Mt =
∑N
i=1 |Rcp,m,Mi,t −Rcp,m,Mmkt,t |
N−1
where Rcp,m,Mi,t (R
cp,m,M
mkt,t ) is the daily arithmetic return at time t of an option written on the
individual stock i (on the market index) with type cp, moneyness m, and maturity M, while N
is the number of individual stocks for which option returns are available at t. The upper panel
refers to calls and the lower panel to puts. Each subplot refers to different moneyness levels,
namely OTM, ATM and ITM (with absolute deltas of 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75, respectively). The
sample period runs from January 1996 to December 2012.
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